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RECENT CASES
EVIDENCE-NEw YoRK,PRESS SHIELD LAW APPLIES ONLY WHEN
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN A NEWSMAN AND

His

SOURCE.

WBAI-FM v. Proskin1 arose under the New York press shield
which was enacted in 1970. An announcer for the appellant,
WBAI-FM (a New York City radio station), received a call from a
person identifying himself only as a member of the "Weather Underground." The anonymous caller took credit for bombing the offices
of the New York State Commissioner of Correctional Services, and directed the announcer to an envelope which had been placed in a public telephone booth. An employee of the station retrieved the letter
which was then read over the air. The letter warned that Commissioner Oswald's offices were about to be bombed. Upon calling the
police, the appellant was told that the police knew of the bomb threat.
The appellant also disseminated the contents of the letter to "all interested news agencies." 3 Later a bomb exploded in the Commissioner's
offices in Albany, and although no one was injured, heavy property
damage was inflicted.
As part of a grand jury investigation, the district attorney caused a
subpoena duces tecum to be served upon the appellant, requesting that
the radio station produce the letter. The appellant moved to quash
the subpoena, relying on the New York shield law, which states that:
law2

no professional journalist or newscaster ...shall be adjudged in contempt by any court, the legislature or other body having contempt
powers, for refusing or failing to disclose any news or the source of
any such news coming into his possession in the course of gathering
of obtaining news for publication ....
4
The Albany County Court denied the motion to quash. 5 The
lower court held that the statute did not apply since the radio station
did nothing to obtain the information, but merely acted as a passive
recipient.
1. 42 App. Div. 2d 5, 344 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dep't 1973) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
2. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1970).
3. Instant case at 6, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
4. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 79-h(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
5. In re WBAI-FM, 68 Misc. 2d 355, 326 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Albany County Ct.

1971).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

This adverse decision was appealed to the third department of
the appellate division, which affirmed the trial court's decision. Held:
The New York shield law protects only the identity of those informants who impart information under a "cloak of confidentiality."
WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 App. Div. 2d 5, 344 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dep't
1973).
The recent United States Supreme Court decision on newsman's
privilege, Branzburg v. Hayes,6 largely relegated newsmen who seek to
protect their sources either to imprisonment or whatever protection the
state legislatures might wish to provide. WBAI-FM v. Proskin suggests
that even when the legislative branch enacts a broadly written shield
law, the courts may impose their own limitations on its scope, significantly reducing the degree of protection. The case gives an indication
of how the courts will deal with a statutory privilege allowing reporters to withhold the names of their sources.
The trial court, in denying the motion to quash, stated that it
would be "ludicrous" to apply the statute in a situation such as this
"where no confidences were involved and where the media was not
exercising a news gathering function when the information was given." 7
The court did not explain or develop its cryptic remark about the lack
of any confidences. However, it did heavily emphasize the passive role
that the radio station played in receiving the letter which it held had
not been elicited as a result of what was unclearly described as "affirmative questioning of persons by a news media agency acting as such.",
This passivity on the part of the station, along with the public interest
in the prosecution of crime, were the critical factors which led to the
denial of the appellant's motion. In rejecting the argument that the
shield law should be interpreted liberally, the court stated that the
6. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburg marked the end to an ill-fated attempt to
establish a first amendment based newsman's privilege. In Caldwell v. United States, 434
F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), which was reversed by Branzburg, the court held that confidential relationships with highly sensitive groups such as the Black Panthers could not
be violated unless the government demonstrated a compelling national interest which
would require the newsman to divulge confidential information. In reversing the Caldwell case, the United States Supreme Court stated that no convincing evidence had
been adduced to show that newsmen would be significantly hampered in their efforts
to gather news. In the absence of such evidence, the Court held that the duty of every
citizen to give evidence outweighed any countervailing considerations based on the
first amendment. For a further discussion of a citizen's duty to testify, see cases and
materials cited note 16 infra.
7. In re WBAI-FM, 68 Misc. 2d 355, 358, 326 N.Y.S.2d 434, 437 (Albany County
Ct. 1971).
8. Id. at 357, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
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law "cannot be distorted through breadth of interpretation to the point
of impairing the orderly process of investigation of crime and prosecution of criminals."9 The court maintained that an application of the
statutory protection would be particularly unjust since the anonymous
caller had attempted to use the news media in order to boast of a
crime which he and others were about to commit. Although the radio
station had argued that the production of the letter would create an
atmosphere of distrust between itself and any dissident groups wishing
to use the station as a forum, the court scoffed at the assertion that first
amendment values were at stake.' 0 The majority ignored the argument
that deterring people from using the media limits freedom of speech
and press.
The primary concern of the trial court was with the detrimental
effect that a liberal interpretation of the shield law would have on the
apprehension and punishment of lawbreakers. Since the court was interpreting a statute which is based on the proposition that the social
value of prosecuting criminals must sometimes give way to higher
values, the failure of the court to deal with the appellant's argument
renders its opinion unpersuasive.
In affirming the lower court ruling, the appellate division largely
ignored the distinction betwen passive and affirmative news gathering
activity which had been a keystone of the lower court's decision. Instead, the court held the statute inapplicable because the letter had
not been imparted under a "cloak of confidentiality.""' . While acknowledging that the statute did not use the word "confidentiality," the
majority felt it proper to read a cloak of confidentiality requiirement
into the law. The court mechanically listed four reasons for this conclusion: First, it argued that the legislative purpose in drafting the
statute had been to protect newsmen from being forced to reveal
confidential communications. The only evidence presented to support
this contention was a statement made by Governor Rockefeller upon
signing the law that the disclosure of confidential communications
posed a "real and imminent threat"' 2 to the free press. Second, the
majority cited People v. Wolf' 3 as a precedent for the cloak of confidentiality requirement. In that case, the first department of the appel9. Id. at 358, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 437.

10. Id.
11. Instant case at 7, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 394-95.
12. Governor's Memorandum, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1970, at 3112.
13. 39 App. Div. 2d 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d 299 (lstDep't 1972).
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late division refused to quash a subpoena for the original manuscript
-of a signed article, reasoning that the document had not been imparted under a clock of confidentiality. 14 Third, the court argued that,
in general, privileges are based upon confidential relationships.Yr
Fourth, it felt that a privilege to withhold information must be strictly
construed, since it is an exception to the fundamental obligation of
all citizens to furnish evidence.'
The court based its finding that the information had not been
imparted in confidence on the author's unwillingness to reveal his identity to the newsman. The letter had not been signed and was left in a
drop so that it would not have to be delivered personally. Since the
author did not trust the newsman enough to reveal his name, it was
inferred that he could not have been relying on the newsman to shield
his identity.' 7 It was felt that the placement of the letter in a public
phone booth where it could be found by anyone provided further evidence of this lack of reliance. The absence of a confidential relationship
was also inferred by the court from the fact that the author had been
willing to speak to anyone who answered the telephone.
Finally, the majority firmly rejected the appellant's claim that the
district attorney must demonstrate his need for the subpoena. The
court held it sufficient that the district attorney wanted the letter as
part of the investigation of a serious crime.'"
Thus, the court was engaged in an implicit balancing of first
amendment values against society's need to deter crime. When the majority stated that testimonial privileges must be strictly construed, it
was actually balancing social values under the guise of a judicial maxim.
14. Id., 333 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
15. Instant case at 7, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
16. The duty of all citizens to give testimony unless specially exempted has long
been recognized by American courts, although the court in the instant case cites no
authority for the proposition. The United States Supreme Court, after reviewing the
various federal statutes which require testimony, concluded: "In all these provisions, as
in the general law upon the subject, it is clearly recognized that the giving of testimony
and the attendance upon court or grand jury in order to testify are public duties which
every person within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform ...

."

Blair

v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919). See also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421, 438 (1932). New York courts have recognized this public duty to give evidence.
E.g., In re Amato, 204 Misc. 454, 458, 124 N.Y.S.2d 726, 730 (1953). Wigmore, the
famous commentator on evidence, strongly believed in the principle that all citizens
should be compelled to give evidence. 8 J. WIGMORE, EvmENcE § 2192 (McNaughton
rev. 1961). Because of his belief in this principle, Wigmore was opposed to the newsman's privilege. Id. § 2286.
17. Instant case it 7, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 394-95.
18. Id., 344 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
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The only justification for weighing competing interests is that the
legislature empowered the courts to engage in this process when it enacted the law. However, as this casenote will later demonstrate, an
analysis of the legislative purpose behind the shield law does not support
this justification.
Judge Cooke, the lone dissenter, criticized the lower court for
making a distinction between passive and affirmative news gathering.19
Citing the sweeping language of the statute, the dissenting judge also
rejected any claim that the scope of the statute should be restricted
when information is sought in a criminal investigation as nothing in
the shield law permitted such balancing of a reporter's right to statutory protection against the court's concern over the problem of crime.
Judge Cooke surprisingly accepted the court's premise that the
statute applies only when some sort of confidential relationship exists
between the newsman and his informant. However, he took the majority to task for their failure to find a confidential disclosure in this
case. The dissent stated that the requirement was fulfilled whenever
there was an "express or implied understanding" that the source's name
would not be revealed, and that such an implied understanding existed
in this case.
Appellant was never given the identity of the person who telephoned
about the letter, the letter itself was not signed by any identifiable
person or legal entity and the very scheme adopted for communicating
the letter reveals a deliberate intention not to reveal the author's
personal identity. All these circumstances yield but one possible conclusion: that the author . . . did not want his personal identity revealed and, therefore, that the letter was communicated under an
implied understanding of confidentiality.20
Thus the key difference between the two opinions is that the majority
defined confidentiality in terms of the informant's willingness to rely
on the newsman to protect his identity, whereas the dissent defined
it in terms of the reporter's understanding of whether the informant
wanted his identity to remain undisclosed.
The dissent's definition of confidentiality is much more persuasive
than the majority's. Under the majority's formulation, the court must
inquire into the source's state of mind. The court must ask itself
19, Id. at 8, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 395-96 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 9-10, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 397 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
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whether the source intended to rely on the reporter. However, this
determination will be difficult since the informant will not be present to testify. The dissent would employ the touchstone of whether
the reporter had reasonable grounds to believe that the source desired secrecy. Since the reporter is available to testify, the inquiry will
be somewhat easier. Judge Cooke's opinion is more in accord with
common sense. It is sophistical and strained to use the desire of the
informant to keep his identity secret from the whole world including
the reporter as evidence that a cloak of confidentiality does not exist.
Although the majority rejected the idea that the statute is intended to protect nonconfidential sources, the legislature might well
have had such a purpose in mind. There are several arguments that
can be made in favor of permitting newsmen to withhold the identity
of all sources along with facts which they may gather when acting in
their professional capacity.
Disclosing a nonconfidential source may inadvertently reveal the
identity of a confidential source.21 Suppose a reporter had formed a
confidential relationship with source A. The newsman has given A repeated assurance that he will not reveal his identity, and correspondingly A has continually told the reporter that he is relying on
him for this purpose. A, wishing to transmit some documents to the
newsman, gives the documents to his friend B and instructs B to give
them to the newsman. The only contact between B and the newsman
occurs when the documents are transmitted. No words are exchanged
between them and B knows nothing of the confidential relationship
between A and the newsman. If a court were to decide that B is a nonconfidential source, then the newsman could be forced to reveal the
identity of B. Once B had been identified, he could be subpoenaed and
forced to reveal the identity of A. Since B is not a newsman, he could
22
not claim any privilege.
Another reason for favoring the protection of all information in
a newsman's possession from forced disclosure is that if a newsman is
required to give evidence to a grand jury or a district attorney, people
who might otherwise be willing to form confidential relationships
21. Comment, Constitutional Protection for the Newsman's Work Product, 6

HARV.

Crv. RIGHTS-Crv. LIB. L. REv. 119, 135 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment]. This
comment is one of the few discussions of newsman's privilege which discusses more than
the question of whether a newsman must reveal a confidential source.
22. The hypothetical example is based on State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30
A.2d 421 (1943).
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with the newsman will be deterred from doing so. 23 These people may

not understand or care that the newsman is supplying information
under compulsion. Furthermore, individuals with unorthodox political
opinions or members of minority groups may be hostile toward anyone who gives help to the government.2 4 Indeed, this contention was
made by the appellant who stated that other radical dissident groups
might be unwilling to use the radio station as a forum for their viewpoints, if the station were compelled to help the district attorney by
producing the letter.2 5 One writer raised an analogous argument against
permitting the government to subpoena films of public events, even
though there is no question of confidentiality involved.
[A]t violent demonstrations photographic equipment may be destroyed
if demonstrators believe the film will later be used for government
investigatory purposes. Furthermore, demonstrators who might otherwise cooperate with newsmen at later interviews may be deterred if
the reporters have aided
the government in the past through the
26
production of such films.

Finally, in the words of Justice Stewart, the government should
not be allowed "to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of government." 27 If this were to happen, the press might
practice self-censorship, 2 as the following hypothetical example will
illustrate. A source insists that the newsman publish his identity, but
the newsman, in the exercise of his discretion, decides not to print
the source's name. In such a case, there is obviously no confidential
relationship since the source wishes to be known. Nevertheless, one
could argue against compelling the newsman to reveal the source's identity on the grounds that the newsman may avoid outspoken people in
the future, if he knows that he may be compelled to testify about them.
23. Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The ConstitutionalRight to a Confidential
Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 368 n.211 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note]. This note
states that a "persuasive constitutional argument" can be made in favor of protecting all
the information which a newsman may gather while acting in his professional capacity.
Although the constitutional arguments are precluded by Branzburg, the same arguments
which could be used in favor of a constitutional privilege can be used in favor of a
statutory one.
24. For an insight into the problems faced by newsmen when dealing with a politically sensitive group such as the Black Panthers, see Caldwell v. United States, 434

F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
25. In re WBAI-FM, 68 Misc. 2d 355, 357, 326 N.Y.S.2d 434, 436 (1971).
26. Note 368 n.211.
27. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
28.

Comment 135, 139.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

Thus, there' are strong policy reasons why the legislature -might
wish to draft a shield law which provides broad protection for the
hewsman. Fortunately, one -need not rely on mere speculation in determining the legislative purpose of the law. Unlike other states, 2 New
York draped the mantle of statutory protection around the news itself
as! well as the source of the news, demonstrating an awareness that
a reporter needs more than a right to conceal the identity of confidential sources. No qualifications or exceptions to this principle are
explicitly set forth in the statute.
INew York State Assemblyman Emeel S. Betros, who was the sponsor of the bill, has stated:
The recent practices of the [United States] Justice Department have
brought to everyone's attention the fact that the news media could
be subjected to unwarranted "fishing" expeditions wherein investigators for these bodies could hope to learn from reporters, their notes,
their research, and conversations, facts and other material which
could later be used in criminal prosecutions. The professional newspaperman frequently possesses [a] mass of notes and information which
he has derived from various sources, some reliable and some not reliable from which he has gleaned his news stories. Frequently, a reportdr
has information.

. .

which because of its dubious nature is not used

for actual publication. Without any protective legislation, these
sources of information could be investigated by agencies under the
threat of citing the newspaperman for contempt for failure to disclose
his files.30

The references by Assemblyman Betros to the need to protect a newsman's notes, his research, his files and the information in those, files
certainly demonstrates a legislative intention to protect more than confidential disclosures of information. It is significant that Assemblyman
Betros' reference to a reporter's conversations contains no mention of
confidentiality.
The statement of Assemblyman Betros evinces a concern about
the attempts of prosecutors to commandeer the research of reporters
in order to save themselves labor. Such fishing expeditions probably
29. Eighteen states now have such shield laws. For a listing of these states, see
Comment, Branzburg v. Hayes: A Need for Statutory Protection of News Sources, 61,Kv.
L.J. 551, 556 n.27 (1973). Most of the state shield laws protect the source only. Comment 122.
30. Memorandum of Emeel S. Betros, in NEw YORK STATE LEOISLATIVE ANNVAL 33
(1970).
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represent an even greater threat to the press than the forced revelation
of sources. Many reporters do not use secret contacts, but every reporter has notes and research material and is therefore vulnerable to,
such expeditions. However, the court in Proskin has extended an open
invitation to raid a journalist's files by reducing the scope of the statute
and telling district attorneys that they do not have to demonstrate their
need for subpoenas. Thus, the decision in Proskin clearly flies in the
face of one of the purposes of the law.
Even the memorandum of Governor Rockefeller, quoted by the majority, 3' casts serious doubt upon the court's limited construction of
the statute. In a portion of the memorandum not quoted by the, court,.
the Governor stated: "This measure affords a stronger safeguard of
the free channels of news communication than most existing legisla,
tion, by protecting newsmen from being compelled to disclose, the in 7
formation they gather, as well as the identity of their informants. The
need 1,to protect both information and sources: was,'affirmed by the.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1963 .... -32 The last sentence isa
reference to In re Taylor,3 3 a case involving a: Pennsylvania,,shield law34
which protected only the source of the, information, but not -the"information itself. The litigation arose when a Pennsylvania newspaper,
revealed that a former municipal official, then under questioning by a
district attorney, had also spoken to the newspaper. The district at
t6rney issued a sweeping subpoena requesting all tape recordings,
ntes, and reports of interviews and conferences with the informant,
all memoranda or documents concerning any investigations, conducted
as a result of those interviews or conversations, and the results of any
polygraph tests performed on the informant. 35 The trial court limited.
the subpoena's coverage to notes and recordings of meetings held with
the informant and ordered the names of any third parties deleted. The
Penfnsylvania Supreme Court upheld the right of the newspaper to
ignore even this limited subpoena, stating that even the greatest of
dare in. deleting names could -not protect against the, possibility of reyealing the identity of some informant other than the one whose identity had already been disclosed.36
,
31'.

Governor's Memorandum, suipra note 12.

'32.

Id.

33. 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).

34.

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit.
28, §-330-(-1958).

35. 412 Pa. at 35, 193 A.2d at 182.
36. Id. at 43-44, 193 A.2d at 186.

,
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The Taylor case did not deal with the usual newsman-informant
relationship, in which the informant refuses to disclose information
unless promised that his identity will not be revealed. The newspaper
had actually published the name of the informant, and stated that he
had spoken to the newspaper. Moreover, the court made no inquiry
into whether the source had established a confidential relationship with
the newspaper. Although one of the reasons given by the court for
its decision was the fear that other sources might be uncovered, there is
no indication that even these sources were confidential. Indeed the
court defined the word "source" to include "documents, inanimate
objects and all sources of information."37 Obviously one cannot form
a confidential relationship with a document. Also, the subpoena in
Taylor was an egregious example of the type of fishing expedition
abhorred by Assemblyman Betros. Furthermore, unlike the court in
the instant case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that shield
laws should be liberally construed because of the importance of a free
38
press to society.
Governor Rockefeller's citation of Taylor is persuasive evidence
that he approved of the broad interpretation which can be placed on
shield laws. It also demonstrates that the Governor was sympathetic to
the many threats posed to a free press, of which the revelation of confidential sources is only one.
Therefore, an analysis of the legislative history of the New York
shield law leads to the conclusion that the Proskin majority erred in
reading into the statute a cloak of confidentiality requirement. When
the language of a statute is clear, and when the evidence demonstrates
that the legislature meant what it said, then a court should not tamper
with the clear commands of the statute. It would indeed be ironic if the
courts, after telling newsmen to look to the legislatures for protection,
were then to strip away whatever protection the legislatures offered.
Not only is the opinion of the majority wrong, the style and
tenor of the decision show a disrespect for the concerns which prompted
enactment of the shield law. The majority satisfied itself with writing
a brief per curiam opinion which mechanically listed reasons for its
decision without elaborating on any of the reasons. However, since
very few decisions have been handed down under this law, the court
should have seized the opportunity to expound upon the reasons for
37. Id. at 40, 193 A.2d at 185.
38. Id.
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the law's enactment. If one only compares the lack of even ritualistic
'praise for the role of a free press with the understanding shown for the
problems faced by prosecutors because of the statute, one must conclude that the court's brevity was motivated, not by reticence, but by
lack of sympathy for the purposes of the law.
The court's reliance on People v. Wolf" is also unpersuasive. The
Wolf case involved an attempt by a zealous district attorney to subpoena
the original manuscript of an article published in The Village Voice40
on the Tombs (New York City house of detention) Riot. 41 The article
had been signed by its author who was an inmate and who had since
become a defendant in a criminal trial stemming from the riot. The
district attorney regarded the article as a form of a confession. The
Village Voice invoked the protection of the New York shield law on
the ground that the content of the manuscript was news which had
come into its possession while engaged in news gathering. The first department of the appellate division refused to quash the subpoena,
arguing that the newspaper had waived the protection of the statute by
printing the entire signed article. While noting the publication's claim
that the article had been edited, the court said that the burden of
proof was on the newspaper to prove this fact, since the person asserting
a privilege has the burden of proof.4 The court then went on to state
in a single sentence that, as pointed out by the lower court, the manu-script had not been imparted under a "cloak of confidentiality." 43
The trial court decision in Wolf 4 was the first decision to importa confidentiality requirement into the statute. The court defined con-fidentiality as an "understanding, express or implied, that the information or its source will not be disclosed . . . ,,45 The court feared theresults which would obtain from a liberal reading of the statute. With-out expounding upon the general nature of these results or why they
were undesirable, the court indicated that without the cloak of confidentiality rationale, a news agency might withhold the negative of a
39. 39 App. Div. 2d 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d 299 (lst Dep't 1972).
40. R. de Leon, Rebellion in the Tombs, The Village Voice, Nov. 5, 1970, at 9, col.
1. For the reaction of The Village Voice to the Wolf case, see id., Feb. 3, 1972, at 3,

col. 1.
41. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1970, at 1, col. 1. The rebellion was later crushed..
Id., Oct. 5, 1970, at 1, col. 8.

42. 39 App. Div. 2d at 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
43. Id.

44. 69 Misc. 2d 256, 329 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
45. Id. at 261, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 297.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

picture or the tape of a news show. The general principle of strict
construction of testimonial privileges was upheld and the court also
found that the newspaper had waived the statute's protection by pub1
lishing a signed article 40
Wolf may have been a defensible result on the peculiar facts of
*that case, but the court in Proskin should not have followed it as it is
inconsistent with the legislative intent behind the shield law. Further,more, the notion of a waiver, which was the other basis of the Wolf
holding is clearly inapplicable to Proskin since the radio station did
not publish the name of the mysterious caller. Nor was the court in the
instant case bound to follow Wolf on grounds of stare decisis. Wolf
was decided by the first department of the appellate division, while
Proskin was decided by the third department. Under New York practice, coordinate tribunals are not bound by each other's opinions,
although such decisions are entitled to respect. 47 There have been many
instances in which the four departments have reached contradictory
48
results.
No one could have faulted the court in Proskin for refusing to
*follow Wolf since the latter case was not a proper vehicle for discussing
confidentiality. The majority in Proskin was not faced with a detailed
and well reasoned exposition of the New York shield law. Since the
court in Wolf had been able to find a waiver in the fact that the name
of the author and presumably the entire contents of the article had
been published, it was unnecessary for the court in Wolf to reach the
issue of confidentiality. Indeed, the cloak of confidentiality rationale
which had absorbed so much of the trial court's attention in Wolf was
relegated to a single sentence by the appellate division opinion, and
was clearly one of the secondary reasons for their result.
The majority's definition of confidentiality in terms of the source's
reliance on the newsman to protect his identity leads to an untenable
conclusion. Suppose the caller in the instant case had given his name
to the newsman and requested that it be kept secret. Under the majority's theory, the newsman might be permitted to withhold the
source's identity on the ground that the informant had given proof of
his willingness to rely on the newsman. However, in terms of public
*policy it is difficult to understand why cases should turn on whether
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., In re Herle's Estate, 165 Misc. 46, 300 N.Y.S. 103 (Sur. Ct. 1937).
48. 1 CARDIODY-WAITE, COURTS AND THEIR JURISDICTION § 2:63 (2d ed. 1965).
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the informant mentions his name or remains anonymous. Even the
more liberal definition of confidentiality given by the dissent is fundamentally wrong because it ignores a crucial aspect of the statute. The
dissent implies that a confidential relationship is present when the
newsman has reasonable grounds to know that his informant does not
want his identity made public. However, the purpose of the shield law.
is not to protect a contract-like relationship, of trust and reliance existing between the newsman and his source. The legislature did not enact
the shield law because it felt that newsmen who violated a relationship
of trust with their sources were reprehensible. If that had been its
purpose, it would not have left the decision of whether or not to testify
to the reporter's discretion. Unlike attorney-client, physician-patient
or priest-penitent privileges, where only the client, patient, or penitent
may waive the privilege, the newsman-informant privilege may be
waived at any time by the newsman.49 This- vital distinction makes
the court's attempt to argue from the general nature of privilege highly
questionable. By permitting the newsman to-breach his ,promise of
secrecy whenever he chooses, the statute itself provides a powerful,
argument against making confidentiality its touchstone.
If Proskin is not reversed, as it should be, then it should at least
be limited. Restricting the application of the case would not be difficult since Proskin presents a peculiar factual situation. Presumably, the
prosecutor did not seek to learn the contents of the letter, since these
already had been broadcast in their entirety, but only to obtain the
letter itself in order to discover the identity of the caller. However,
the appellant did not know the caller's identity and was not using the
letter to discover it. The radio station had in a sense mined the letter
for all the information it wished to extract. The investigative agency
was not seeking to appropriate the labor and research of a reporter:
The fact that the appellant had something in his possession useful'to
the district attorney was almost happenstance. Thus, in those cases where
some of the facts imparted are still unpublished or where the news
agency is seeking to develop those facts, Proskin arguably should not
be applied. Concededly, such a limitation is somewhat arbitrary since
it is difficult to see why the existence of confidentiality should depend
on what is done with the information communicated. However, given
a choice between limiting the statute and limiting Proskin, courts will
hopefully decide to limit the latter.
49. Note 343.
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However much one may criticize the court for tampering with what
appears to be the clear language of the statute, one must concede that
even a sympathetic court would find a resolution of Proskin difficult,
were it not for the statute. If one considers only the competing public
interest involved, the difficulty of striking an acceptable balance becomes readily apparent. Unquestionably Branzburg v. Hayeslo would
require the courts to decide against the radio station. However, by
relating the common arguments given for and against a newsman's
privilege to the factual situation in Proskin, the reasons why the case
is troublesome will become dear.
The usual arguments in favor of newsman's privilege are not appropriate in this case. One of the most common of these arguments
is that by permitting sources to speak freely and by allowing newsmen
to gather information without fear of government subpoenas, the dissemination of ideas and information will be encouraged.r1 However,
in the instant case, the informational content of what was communicated was minimal. The public learned from the letter that a bomb was
about to explode in a public building and that the "Weather Underground" took credit for the incident. The first fact would have been
learned in any event, and it is not dear from the court's opinion
whether the letter had even been intended as an advance warning.
Even if the letter had been so intended it must be conceded that a
defense of newsman's privilege on the grounds that it affords criminals a safe way to give advance warnings of their crimes is a far less
attractive argument than those arguments based on the free dissemination of ideas. The only other fact communicated by the letter-that
the "Weather Underground" was the perpetrator of the crimes-pertains to the identity of the informant. However, it is the identity of the
informant which would be protected by a privilege. Some may find it
offensive that an informant should be allowed to use the law to reveal
as much of his identity as he chooses, without revealing enough to
cause his apprehension.
Another purpose of shield laws is to protect the source from unfair
retribution. For example, an informant who "leaks" information embarrassing to the government may lose his job if his identity becomes
known. However, this value is nonexistent in the instant case. The
anonymous caller was not seeking to avoid unfair retribution; rather,
50. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
51. Comment 124-26.
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he was seeking to avoid justice. Nor is this a case in which a minor
criminal attempts to inform on a major criminal. In such a situation
society may be willing to permit a newsman to shield the identity of
the minor criminal, so that the important criminal may be revealed.
Newsman's privilege is also justified on grounds that it is a
legal recognition of the ethical problems faced by newsmen.5 2 However, in circumstances similar to those of the instant case, many (perhaps most) newsmen would feel no moral obligation to protect the
source's identity. Indeed, many newsmen would be delighted to dis53
cover who was responsible for a bombing.
In most discussions of newsman's privilege, the civic repsonsibility of all citizens to come forth with evidence54 is usually balanced
against the value of a free press. Nevertheless, in the instant case the
prosecutor never demonstrated the probative value of the letter. Did
the district attorney wish to analyze the handwriting or the typesetting
of the document? The prosecutor's motives were not indicated, and
indeed the dissent suggests that the prosecutor knew who the source
was. 5
Unfortunately, the fact that the court was faced with a difficult
case, in which the competing interests on both sides were weak, may
have led it to overlook the clear language of the statute. In its efforts
to avoid what it considered an unjust result, the court read into the
atatute requirements and qualifications which might seriously weaken
the law in those cases which merit its unrestricted application.
If the holding in Proskin is limited strictly to its facts, then its
.52. "The public is shocked when a newsman is jailed or fined for so acting [refusing to violate his code of conduct] and has demanded through certain of its state legislatures that he be protected." Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging
the Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. REv. 61, 83 (1950). This is an old, but still
useful study of a statutory newsman's privilege.
53. See Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An EmpiricalStudy, 70 MicH. L. REv. 229,
259 (1971). Blasi distributed questionnaires posing a series of hypotheticals to 1,470
newsmen. He received 975 replies. The hypothetical questions asked what a newsman
would do if he were to discover that a confidential source was planning to commit a
crime or had already committed one. Blasi discovered that:
[P]erhaps the most significant statistic in all these data is that almost half of the
journalists surveyed say they would, even if favored with an absolute privilege,
give testimony before a grand jury that could well result in life imprisonment
or worse for sources with whom they enjoy a close, professionally rewarding
relationship.
Id. Blasi's study is most useful for those who are not familiar with the complexities of
a newsman's job.
54. For a discussion of this issue, see note 16 supra.
55. Instant case at 9, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 396 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
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impact may be minimal. The factual situation which arose in the
instant case is not one likely to arise often in the careers of most
newsmen, since few criminals use the press in order to announce their
crimes in advance. Moreover, if the newsman does not know the identity of the source, then he will probably be able to offer little help to
the authorities. However, the logic of the court would seem to place
all anonymous informants, no matter how valuable their information,
beyond the scope of statutory protection. An anonymous informant
who has knowledge of official misconduct may not have demonstrated
his reliance on the newsman any more than did the informant in
Proskin, under whose rationale he would be treated no differently.
Nameless callers who are not criminals intent on publicizing their
crimes are sometimes helpful to reporters. Professor Vince Blasi, in
an empirical study on the question of newsman's privilege, discovered
that:
In a few situations confidentiality will take still another form: the
identity of the source will remain unknown even to the reporter.
Some investigative reporters have gotten big stories from unsolicited,
anonymous sources. The mystery man may, for example, leave revealing documents in a bus station locker, or he may phone regularly at
an appointed hour. 56
The notion of confidentiality itself probably poses the most significant danger to the functioning of a free press. The relationship
of the informant to the newsman often defies easy analysis. Often the
7
two parties reach no consensus about what is on or off the record.
Yet, if a reporter were to state that at no time was he asked to leave
a particular statement unattributed, a court, relying on Proskin, might
force him to divulge the name of his informant. How many reporters
would relish the prospect of attempting to explain to a judge how
they knew that a particular source was relying on them to leave a
statement unattributed in the absence of a specific request? 8 Professor
Blasi also discovered that sympathetic reporters will omit details in a
56. Blasi, supra note 53, at 243-44.
57. Id.
58. Cf. Note 345. The author, who deals with the problems involved in proving
the existence of a confidential relationship in a brief but excellent passage, suggests
that a presumption of confidentiality be established. Such a presumption could be rebutted only with conclusive proof. Such a solution would be impossible if the Wolf
case controlled. The Wolf case put the burden on the newsman to prove that the statutory
privilege was applicable. 39 App. Div. 2d at 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 299, 301.
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story even though an informant did not request that they be deleted.
Or a reporter may tell an informant that it would be safer if his name
were withheld.59 Yet such practices might cause a newsman to forfeit
the statute's protection. Suppose that newsmen were to withhold the
name of an informant when publishing a story even though the source
rashly insisted that his name be divulged. An interesting question
arises should the informant in the hypothetical case later change .his
mind and ask that his name be withheld. Proskin does not make clear
whether a cloak of confidentiality can be created after the information
is communicated or whether it must have existed at the time of the original meeting between the reporter and his source.
Proskin does not indicate what an informant must do in order
to show that he is relying on a newsman to protect his identity. Is it
sufficient that the informant tell the newsman his name or must he
expressly request secrecy? One may seriously doubt whether courts will
allow the holding in Proskin to be avoided by the simple expedient
of the informant giving his name. On the other hand, there will often
be no express promises of or requests for secrecy. Courts will then
have to rely on circumstantial inferences, especially since the best witness on the issue, the source himself, will obviously be unavailable to
testify.60 Under the holding in Wolf, the burden of proof will be on
the newsman to show that the privilege is properly asserted. Although
the only germane question would be whether the source had in fact relied on the newsman to protect his identity, the courts may well be
tempted to apply the reasonable man standard. The inquiry would
then be whether a reasonable man, in the position of the informant,
could have expected the newsman to conceal his identity. For example,
courts might well conclude that whenever an informant has only one
contact with a newsman by telephone or letter, the source could not
reasonably believe that a newsman would feel obligated to protect his
identity. Or assume the following hypothetical: a petty criminal with
connections in the underworld has given useful but unexciting information to a newsman in the past. The information has been imparted on the understanding that the source's identity will not be revealed. The informant, who has developed friendly feelings for the
newsman, tells the newsman that he committed a famous murder at the
command of X. The reporter then prints the fact that X ordered the
59. Blasi, supranote 53, at 242.
60. Note 345.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

murder. A district attorney might argue that the newsman should be
forced to reveal his source on grounds that the information communicated was so dissimilar to earlier information that the informant could
not reasonably believe that the original promises were still in force.
Of course, a court sympathetic to the problems faced by newsmen would
not apply such reasoning, since it is more appropriate to contract law
than newsman's privilege. However, courts in New York and many
other jurisdictions61 have displayed no such sympathy.
The court in the instant case was concerned only with that portion
of the statute which protects a newsman from being forced to reveal
the identity of his source. However, the confidentiality requirement
might easily be extended to that portion of the statute which prevents
a journalist from having to divulge, under threat of contempt, news
which has come into his possession. If Proskin has been correctly decided, then such a result might well be required. Why should a newsman who has received news from a nonconfidential source be compelled to reveal the source, but not the news imparted? The statutory
protection of news might be restricted to those cases in which the news
has come from confidential sources, or it might even be limited to those
situations where the news itself was communicated on an understand62
ing that it would not be published.
Before seeking to draw any conclusions about how the New York
courts have treated the shield law, it is necessary to discuss briefly
People v. Dan.6 3 The litigation arose after a television reporter and his
cameraman had been permitted inside the Attica penitentiary, at a
time when the inmates were in control of the facility. While speaking
to the inmates, the newsman allegedly witnessed certain events in
61.
Although the trend seems favorable for a statutory creation of a journalistic
privilege, any legislation thus produced faces a judiciary which has chosen to
construe the scope and effect of existing legislation along narrow boundaries
and has rendered most shield statutes virtually impotent. Most past legislative
efforts to extend an evidentiary privilege to newsmen thereby seem to have
been thwarted.
Note, The "Shield" Statute: Solution to the Newsman's Dilemma, 7 VAL. U.L. Rrv. 235,
238-39 (1973). This is a good summary of the existing, and fairly meager, case law
which has developed under state confidentiality laws. For two older studies on the
same subject, see Note, supra note 52; Comment, Compulsory Disclosure of a Newsman's
Source: A Compromise Proposal, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 243 (1959). For an annotation on
the subject, see Annot., 7 A.L.R. 3d 591 (1966).
62. Newsmen often will collect information which is never published. Such information is used for purposes of assessment or verification.
63. 41 App. Div. 2d 687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731 (4th Dep't 1973).
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which the prosecutor was interested. The fourth department of the appellate division held that the shield law did not prevent newsmen from
being forced to testify about events which they had personally observed. The court went on to state that what the prisoners had told
the newsmen, as opposed to what the reporters had seen, might be
protected.
Like the decision in Proskin, Dan was a brief and unimaginative
decision. The court ignored the clear statutory language which protects a journalist from having to disclose any news which comes into
his possession while engaged in newsgathering. The decision does not
expound upon why a distinction should be made between what the
reporter hears and what he sees. Also ignored was the fact that had it
not been for the confidential relationship with the prisoners, the reporter and his cameraman would not have been permitted into the
prison. Dan is not a case in which a newsman accidently witnessed
events which might be relevant to grand jury investigation. The reporter went into the prison with the intention of discovering the
conditions inside the prison, a topic which the grand jury was seeking to explore. Perhaps it should not matter whether the information
actually obtained by a reporter is of a wholly different nature from the
information originally sought by him. However, Dan is a strong case
for the press because the court did not have to face the issue of what
to do when there is such a difference.
When one considers Proskin along with the other cases decided
thus far under the New York shield law, several conclusions become
apparent. The most obvious of these is that the courts will not construe the statute as providing absolute protection. Since courts are
unwilling to find that first amendment rights are absolute, it is not
surprising that they will refuse to construe a state statute as conferring
an absolute privilege.
It is also apparent that the New York shield law has been tightly
restricted so as to apply only to the familiar case in which a newsman refuses to violate promises of secrecy given to an informant.
Attempts in Proskin, Wolf and Dan to apply the statute to situations
other than the classical one have failed. Of course, this does not mean
that the statute is an unqualified failure, since there will be many
cases in which confidentiality, no matter how defined, will clearly be
present. One does not know how many subpoenas have been quietly
withdrawn after the news media asserted their rights under the statute.
547
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Finally one must conclude that despite its legislative history, the
courts will not look upon the New York statute as evidence of a
strong state policy against all governmental intrusions into the workings
of the free press. This conclusion is demonstrated by the explicit refusal of the majority in Proskin to construe the statute liberally and
also by their refusal to require the district attorney to show anything
more than that he desired the letter to investigate a serious crime. Thus
if these lower court decisions are sustained by the New York Court of
Appeals, there will be little protection for newsmen outside the increasingly narrow scope of the statute.
ROBERT L. NISELY

FAMILY LAW-A MAN WHO CONSENTS TO THE HETEROLOGOUS
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION OF His WIFE Is THE CHILD'S FATHER WHOSE
PERMISSION IS REQUIRED FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE CHILD BY ANOTHER.

During the marriage of W and H a child, conceived by artificial
insemination, was born. H, who had full knowledge of the procedure
and who had given his consent, was listed on the birth certificate as
the child's father. The couple separated and were subsequently divorced; both the separation agreement and the divorce decree declared
the child to be the daughter of W and H. The husband complied with
all provisions of the divorce decree and retained visitation rights. The
wife remarried and her new husband, H' (petitioner in this case),
sought to adopt the child of the wife's first marriage.
Under the New York Domestic Relations Law, if a child is designated as born "in wedlock," both "parents" must consent to the adoption.' Upon H's refusal to consent, petitioner instituted adoption proceedings in the Surrogate's Court of Kings County, claiming that H's
1. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1964).
Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall
be required as follows:
2. Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a
child born in wedlock;
S. Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock ....

Id.

